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Abstract
We model rent seeking in litigation in weak legal systems as a Tulloch
contest in which litigators may seek to inﬂuence the court directly through
bribery as well as through the merit of the legal case that they bring. If
the local ﬁrm has a competitive advantage in inﬂuencing the court then
there is a strategic asymmetry between the players: the local ﬁrm regards
expenditure by the foreign ﬁrm as a strategic complement, but the for-
eign ﬁrm regards local expenditure as a strategic substitute. This leads to
diﬀerent attitudes to commitment: the local ﬁrm would like to commit to
a high level of eﬀort to inﬂuence the court, the foreign ﬁrm to a low one.
There is also an asymmetry in the commitment technology. It is not easy
to commit to a low level of bribery, but it is feasible to commit to a high
one: once a payment is made it cannot easily be recovered. We model
the interaction as a two stage game: the players simultaneously commit
to a minimum level of eﬀort, then they play a simultaneous Tulloch inﬂu-
ence game. We ﬁnd a continuum of equilibria. An equilibrium selection
argument selects a unique equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to the
Stackelberg equilibrium of a simple Tulloch contest in which the local ﬁrm
moves ﬁrst. We thus ﬁnd an argument for endogenous timing: the local
ﬁrm moves ﬁrst and secures a ﬁrst mover advantage.
Key Words judicial corruption, Tulloch contest, strategic asymmetry,
commitment games, endogenous timing
JEL Codes D73, D86, K41
Most economic models of litigation focus on the behavior of litigants playing
a game whose rules are set by the legal institutions within which the game is
played. At the end of the game, after all the players’ decisions are made and
their actions taken, the outcome of the legal process is determined by a perfectly
impartial judge who weighs the evidence in a balanced and even-handed manner
(see for example the survey by Kobayashi and Parker [10]).
However in many parts of the world, courts are far from perfect. In weak legal
systems inﬂuence, bribery, corruption and bias are prevalent. These defects can
be expected to have far reaching implications for the conduct of litigation; for
1the decision to litigate, to settle, or to use informal or private dispute resolution
mechanisms; and for the incentive to create, or to avoid creating, disputes.
Mui [12] presents evidence from Peru, Taiwan, Russia and the United States
on “the ubiquity of judicial corruption and judicial favoritism in many societies.”
Busaglia [?] provides detailed evidence of the prevelance of detailed corruption
in a number of South American countries, Gong [8] discusses the evidence with
respect to China, and Linnan [11] presents a notorious Indonesian case study.
Judicial corruption is placed within the context of the broader literature on
corruption in the surveys of Bowles [1] and Kaufman and Wei [9].
In this paper we follow Farmer and Pecorino [6] in modelling litigation as
a Tullock [13] rent seeking game. Justice is often portrayed as a blind goddess
weighing the evidence in a pair of scales. Here we allow the possibility that not
only evidence (the raw facts) may be placed in the scales but also a small bag of
coins. We also allow that the scales may be biased in one direction or the other.
In the context that we have in mind, namely weak legal systems in third world
countries, disputes are likely to arise between a local and a foreign ﬁrm. In this
case a bias towards the local ﬁrm is very possible, and has been documented in
many instances. This bias may arise from cultural sympathies and even through
government policy. The local ﬁrm, which may expect to deal repeatedly with
the local legal system, has a natural incentive to invest in building a favorable
long term relationship with the court. The foreign ﬁrm may not have the same
incentive, it may not be linked into the social infrastructure that can facili-
tate the creation of such relationships, and it may face legal sanctions in the
international community that discourage it from engaging in corrupt practices.
There are two key observations that lie behind our analysis. The ﬁrst is that
the presence of even a small degree of judicial bias breaks the symmetry between
the two disputing ﬁrms, and their strategic incentives become quite diﬀerent.
From the point of view of the local ﬁrm, expenditures in judicial inﬂuence are
strategic complements (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 1993 [4]). The local
ﬁrm has an incentive to play aggressively, ratcheting up expenditures. From
the point of view of the foreign ﬁrm, expenditures are strategic substitutes.
The foreign ﬁrm has an incentive to play cautiously, limiting if possible the
expenditures of both ﬁrms. (A somewhat similar point is made by Dixit [5] in
his analysis of sporting contests and patent races). This strategic asymmetry,
which arises purely from the structure of the game, means that the two ﬁrms
have quite diﬀerent attitudes about committing to expenditure.
Our second observation is about an asymmetry in the commitment technol-
ogy. It is relatively easy to commit to a high level of expenditure. This can be
done by paying a bribe; once that is done, it is very diﬃcult to take it back. On
the other hand, the promise not to pay a bribe is not so credible if it may later
become advantageous to do so. This asymmetry means that the local ﬁrm is
favorably placed with respect to its ability to commit to its preferred position1.
1It is interesting to note that the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act and the OECD Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Oﬃcials in International Business Transactions
make it a crime for US or OECD ﬁrms to bribe foreign government oﬃcials. One eﬀect of
this legislation is to improve a foreign ﬁrm’s ability to commit to its preferred low bribery
2In Section 1 we study a simple one stage judicial inﬂuence game in which both
players move simultaneously to inﬂuence the court. We also consider Stackelberg
games, where one or the other ﬁrm has the opportunity to move ﬁrst. In Section
2 we study a two stage game; in the ﬁrst stage both players may make an
irreversible commitment; in the second they play the inﬂuence game, subject
to a constraint that their expenditure may be greater, but not less, than their
prior commitment. We ﬁnd a continuum of equilibria. In Section 3 we apply
an equilibrium selection argument based on Cournot learning which selects a
unique outcome.
1 Inﬂuencing the Court
We consider a dispute that has arisen between two ﬁrms F (the “foreign” ﬁrm)
and L (the “local ﬁrm”) over an asset whose value we will normalise to 1. The
dispute has been brought before the court; we model the court’s decision as
the outcome of a simple Tullock contest that weighs the claim f brought by
the foreign ﬁrm and the claim l brought by the local ﬁrm. It decides in favour
of F with probability
f
l+f, and in favour of L with probability l
l+f. The claim
f = f0 + f1 + f2 + ... is made up of a number of components. For example f0
might be the intrinsic merit of the case (including the evidence), f1 might be
investment in legal work to present the case, and f2 might be the payment of a
bribe to inﬂuence the court. The case l will be composed of a similar number
of components. The court places the bags f0, f1, f2, ... and l0, l1, l2, ... in the
scales, and the odds of deciding in favour of either party are proportional to the
total weight in either side of the scales.
The contestents will choose f and l through their investment in inﬂuencing
the outcome of court. We will not specify the precise nature of this investment
– since we are interested in weak legal systems, the investment that we have
principally in mind is bribery. Even if they make no attempt to inﬂuence the
court, their case may still carry some weight, due to its intrinsic merit. Thus
the intrinsic merit of the case can be represented by a constraint on the decision
variables: f ≥ f0 and l ≥ l0. For the moment we will ignore the existence of such
constraints (eﬀectively setting f0 = l0 = 0). We assume, for reasons set out in
the introduction, that the local ﬁrm can inﬂuence the court at lower cost than
can the foreign ﬁrm. We thus consider the following expected proﬁt functions

















Figure 1: The One Shot Inﬂuence Game
We adopt this simple functional form for simplicity in exploring the nature of
the rent seeking that may occur. More complicated speciﬁcations of the contest
function, and other ways of specifying bias in favour of the local ﬁrm do not
lead to any new insights. In the absence of a full decision theoretic model of the
court’s behaviour, the simplest model seems to be the most appropriate.
We consider ﬁrst a simultaneous move game, in which the two ﬁrms choose
f and l to maximise their objectives (1), (2). We will denote n = (fn,ln)
the equilibrium actions. A simple calculation shows that this equilibrium is as
follows.
Proposition 1 (Simultaneous Inﬂuence Game) If both players move si-
multaneously, the best response functions are



























It is clear that in this simple contest that ln > fn, and that πL
n > πF
n; the
local ﬁrm inﬂuences the court more aggressively, and earns higher proﬁts by
doing so. We note, in particular, that the slopes of the reaction curves at the
equilibrium point are








so we conﬁrm that the local ﬁrm has a downward sloping reaction curve, while
the foreign ﬁrm has an upward sloping reaction curve.
It is interesting to consider what these ﬁrms would do if they had perfect
commitment power, moving ﬁrst in a Stackelberg version of the contest.
Proposition 2 (Local Firm Moves First) If the local ﬁrm moves ﬁrst, it


















Proposition 3 (Foreign Firm Moves First) If the foreign ﬁrm moves ﬁrst,


















We note that the local ﬁrm would like to play aggressively, committing to a
high level of expenditure. By doing so it not only increases its inﬂuence with
the court, it induces the foreign ﬁrm to reduce its expenditure, since the foreign
reaction curve is downward sloping. On the other hand, the foreign ﬁrm would
like to play cautiously, reducing its expenditure in the knowledge that the local
ﬁrm then has an incentive to do the same, since the local reaction curve is
upward sloping. Figure 1 shows the reaction curves and the three equilibria.
2 Commitment
We now consider a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the ﬁrms simultaneously
commit to expenditures (L,F); we imagine them doing so by paying a bribe.
In the second stage, they play the simultaneous move inﬂuence game described
above, subject to the constraints l ≥ L and f ≥ F. That is to say, we model
commitment as a reduction in the strategy space available in the second stage
game. We seek subgame perfect equilibria of this two stage game. For a more
abstract approach to commitment games see Bade et al [14] and Renou [15].
It is easy to check that, at the second stage, the reaction curves are the same
as in the one shot game, but truncated below by the precommitted expenditure
(see Figure 2).
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium in the Second Stage Game) Given the pre-
commitments (L,F), the equilibrium in the second stage inﬂuence game is
(l,f) =

    
    
(ln,fn) if L ≤ ln and F ≤ fn ￿
L, ˆ f (L)
￿




if F > fn and L ≤ ˆ l(F)
(L,F) if L > ˆ l(F) and F > ˆ f (L).
Proof. In each case it is necessary to check that the proposed equilibrium













Reaction FunctionsSubject to aMinimumCommitment
Figure 2: The Second Stage Inﬂuence Game







ˆ f (L) = max
￿
F, ˆ f (L)
￿
if L > ln and F ≤ ˆ f (L). The second condition holds directly by the assumption
that F ≤ ˆ f (L). To establish the ﬁrst condition it is necessary to consider the
slopes of the reaction curves. Since L > ln, ˆ f (L) < fn. But ˆ l(f) is monotonic












The mapping from the ﬁrst stage strategy (L,F) to the second stage equi-





Figure 3: Equilibrium in the Second Stage
dot; the resulting equilibrium by the head of the arrow.
Working back, we can now compute reaction correspondednces and the equi-
librium correspondence in the ﬁrst stage commitment game.
Proposition 5 (The Commitment Game) The reaction functions in the com-
mitment game are
ˆ F (L) =
￿
[0,fn] if 0 ≤ L ≤ ln ￿
0, ˆ f (L)
￿





ll if 0 ≤ F ≤ fl
ˆ f−1 (F) if fl ≤ F ≤ fn ￿
0,ˆ l(F)
￿
if F ≥ fn.
where by ˆ f−1 (F) we mean the inverse image of F under the downward sloping
8portion of the foreign reaction curve; that is, the unique point l ≥ ln such
that ˆ f (l) = F. The equilibrium correspondence is the union of three lines: the
horizontal line [0,ln] × {fn}, the vertical line {ll} × [0,fl], and the segment of
the F reaction curve between L and n :
￿￿
l, ˆ f (l) : ln ≤ l ≤ ll
￿￿
.
Proof. Let us ﬁrst consider the foreign ﬁrm. If 0 ≤ L ≤ ln then, referring to
Proposition 4 and Figure 4, the foreign ﬁrm can choose the simultaneous Nash
point n, by choosing F ∈ [0,fn], or points on the local reaction curve which lie
above the Nash point by choosing F > fn. Since the foreign Stackelberg point
lies below fn, it will clearly make the former choice. If L > ln, then the foreign
ﬁrm can secure ˆ f [L], which is by deﬁnition its preferred point, by choosing
F ∈
￿
0, ˆ f (L)
￿
.
Now consider the local ﬁrm. If 0 ≤ F ≤ fl then this ﬁrm can achieve its
preferred commitment point by choosing L = ll. If fl ≤ F ≤ fn than it can





Nash point; or by choosing L > ˆ f−1 (F) it can choose any point on the interval ￿
ˆ f−1 (F),∞
￿
×F, which is to the right of the reaction curve. However the local
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is continuously decreasing over this range so it will not make the
latter choice. Among the points on the reaction curve that it can choose, it will
wish to bee as close as possible to its Stackelberg commitment point. It can do
this by choosing L = ˆ f−1 (F). Finally, if F ≥ fn then the analysis is foreign





These reaction correspondences, and the equilibrium correspondence, are
shown in Figure 4.
We are now in a position to summarise the subgame perfect equilibria that
can arise in this two stage came of commitment and judicial inﬂuence. Any point
(L,F) on the foreign ﬁrm’s reaction curve betweeen the simultaneous move Nash
point and the local ﬁrm’s Stackelberg point can arise as an equilibrium. Both
ﬁrms commit in the ﬁrst stage of the game to (L,F), and then make no further
expenditure in the second stage of the game. There are two further types of
equilibria, occuring at the ends of the interval, which are of little interest. In one,
the foreign ﬁrm commits fully to the Nash expenditure fn, and the local ﬁrm
commits only partially to expenditure l < ln. However the local ﬁrm raises its
expenditure to the Nash level at the second stage; the outcome is little diﬀerent
to if it had fully committed in the ﬁrst place. There is a similar equilibrium
at the other end of the interval, with the local ﬁrm fully committing to the
Stackelberg point, and the foreign ﬁrm only partially committing, but then
raising its expenditure in the second stage.
So far we have assumed that the court is inﬂuenced only by the eﬀorts made
by the ﬁrms. However the case presumably has some intrinsic merit, determined
by the facts and the law, even before any attempts to inﬂuence the court. The
most straight forward way to model this is to assume that the ﬁrms start with
some endowment (L0,F0) of inﬂuence reﬂecting the nature of the dispute. We































Foreign Com m itm entReaction Function
Figure 4:
10Stage 1 Nature chooses the endowment (L0,F0)
Stage 2 The ﬁrms simultaneously commit to L ≥ L0, F ≥ F0.
Stage 3 The ﬁrms simultaneously exert eﬀorts f ≥ F and l ≥ L, at costs f−F0
and k(l − L0).









− k(l − L0) (4)
we see that the endowment changes the total proﬁt but not the marginal proﬁt.
It may thus aﬀect which disputes are brought to litigation, but not the strategy
once they are brought before the court, except through the constraints L ≥ L0,
F ≥ F0.Thus this game may be analysed simply by introducing these constraints
into commitment game studied previously.
It is easy to check that the constraint L ≥ L0 binds if and only if the
endowment point (L0,F0) lies to the right of the ˆ L(F) reaction correspondence
shown in Figure 4, and that the constraint F ≥ F0 binds if and only if the
endowment point (L0,F0) lies above the ˆ F (L) reaction correspondence. Thus
we have
Proposition 6 (The Commitment Game with Endowment) Let (L0,F0)
be the initial endowment of inﬂuence with the court.
1. If L0 ≤ ll and F0 ≤ min
￿
fn, ˆ f (L0)
￿
then neither constraint binds and the
equilibrium correspondence is as in Prop 5. This occurs if the endowment
point lies inside the equilibrium correspondence in Figure 4.
2. If L0 > ll and F0 ≤ min ˆ f (L0) then the local ﬁrm is constrained and sets
l = L = L0; the foreign ﬁrm reacts by setting f = F = ˆ F (L0). This occurs
if the endowment point lies to the right of the equilibrium correspondence,
and under the foreign reaction curve.
3. If F0 > fn and L0 ≤ ˆ l(F0) then the foreign ﬁrm is constrained and sets
f = F = F0; the local ﬁrm reacts by setting l = L = ˆ l(F0).This occurs if
the endowment point lies above the equilibrium correspondence, and to the
left of the local reaction curve.
4. In the remaining case both the constraints bind, and l = L = L0, f = F =
F0.
113 Equilibrium Selection
Is it possible to select among the equilibria of the commitment games of Propo-
sitions 5 and 6? In this section we consider a simple learning mechanism based
on Cournot dynamics , and show that with probability 1 that it converges to
the Stackelberg outcome. For simplicity we discuss a version of the commitment
game of Proposition 5; the case with an endowment is similar.
Since there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the commit-
ment game, we apply backward induction to consider the following one stage
truncated version of the game: the players simultaneously choose commitments
(L,F) and receive the equilibrium payments from the subsequent subgame. The
best reply correspondences for this truncated game are shown in Figure 4.
The players repeatedly play this truncated game, but they do so myopically
, responding optimally to the opponent’s previous play:
Lk+1 ∈ ˆ L(Fk)
Fk+1 ∈ ˆ F (Fk).
Where the best response is multiple valued, we assume that all possible best
responses are played with equal probability. For a discussion of such Cournot
dynamics in the context of learning and equilibrium selection see Fudenberg and
Levine [7].
Proposition 7 (Cournot Dynamics in the Commitment Game) With prob-
ability 1 the sequence of play converges to the Stackelberg outcome.
Proof. Consider Figure 5. Let ak ∈ [ln,ll] be a strictly increasing sequence
of numbers such that a0 = ln and ak → ll, and let Ak be the rectangle
with vertices
￿




ll, ˆ f (ll)
￿
. The area of this rectangle is αk =
(ll − ak)
￿
ˆ f (ll) − ˆ f (ak)
￿
. It is clear that that the sequence αk is strictly monoton-
ically decreasing to zero.
Consider a sequence of play (Li,Fi), beginning with an arbitrary (L0,F0).
It is clear from the reaction correspondences of Figure 4 that the sets Ak are
absorbing: once play enters such a rectangle it can never leave. It is also clear
that Lk ≤ fn for k ≥ 1, and that, with probability 1, F2 ≥ ln. Thus with
probability 1, (L2,F2) ∈ A0. To simplify notation, we may assume without loss
of generality that (L0,F0) ∈ A0. We aim to show for any k that, with probability
1, eventually (Li,Fi) ∈ Ak, and hence that with probability 1, Li → ll.
Let us choose a ﬁxed rectangle Ak, k ≥ 1, and estimate an upper bound for
the probability πi that the point (Li+1,Fi+1) ￿∈ Ak, assuming that (Li,Fi) ￿∈
Ak. Since the probability of entering Ak is decreasing in both Li and Fi, we
may assume that (Li,Fi) =
￿
ln, ˆ f (ln)
￿
, which is at the top left corner of the
rectangle A0. From the reaction correspondences, the next point (Li+1,Fi+1)
will be chosen uniformly within the rectangle Ak. The probability that it lies












The probability that the point has not entered the rectangle by play i is the






i → ∞. Thus, with probability 1, the play must eventually enter Ak.
Now assume that Li ￿→ ll. Then for some k, the sequence of play never
enters Ak (for otherwise Li → ll, because the sets Ak are nested). But this is
the probability zero event. Thus the probability that Li ￿→ ll is the union of a
countable collection of null events.
4 Conclusion
We model rent seeking in litigation in weak legal systems as a Tulloch contest
in which litigators may seek to inﬂuence the court directly through bribery as
well as through the merit of the legal case that they bring. We notice that there
is a strategic asymmetry between the players if we assume that the local ﬁrm
has a competitive advantage in inﬂuencing the court, and that this asymmetry
means that the ﬁrms have diﬀerent attitudes to commitment. The local ﬁrm
would like to commit to a high level of bribery in order to induce the foreign
ﬁrm to back down; the foreign ﬁrm would like to commit to a low bribery eﬀort,
as it knows that this low eﬀort would be matched by the foreign ﬁrm.
We also notice that there is an asymmetry in the commitment technology
available to the two ﬁrms. It is relatively easy to commit to a high eﬀort; this
can be done by paying a bribe, which cannot easily be undone. On the other
13hand, it is not so easy to credibly commit not to pay a bribe in the future if,
when the decision point comes, it is advantageous to do so.
We model the interaction of these asymmetries through a two stage game.
In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms play a commitment game in which the players simulta-
neously reduce their strategy spaces by commiting to a minimum bribery eﬀort.
In the second stage they play a Tulloch inﬂuence contest in which they may
increase, but not decrease the bribery eﬀort. We ﬁnd a continuum of equilibria.
By applying an equilibrium selection argument, we select a unique equilibrium
that is outcome equivalent to the Stackelberg equilibrium of a simple inﬂuence
contest in which the local ﬁrm moves ﬁrst.
We thus ﬁnd that the outcome is quite simple. The strategic asymmetry
induced by even a small degree of comparative advantage in inﬂuencing the
court leads to an endogenous resolution of the timing issue. In eﬀect, the local
ﬁrm moves ﬁrst and is a Stackelberg leader in the contest to inﬂuence the court.
If the ﬁrms engage in pre-trial negotiation, then we predict that the Stackelberg
outcome will function as the threat point.
Since inﬂuence with the court, even if it is rarely used in practice, improves
the negotiating strength of the local ﬁrm, we would expect to see the local
ﬁrm investing in building up good relations with the judiciary, and creating or
exploiting disputes of little merit to extract rents from the relationship with
the foreign ﬁrm. Since it beneﬁts from these rents, and is exposed to little risk
if litigation is rare, the judiciary may well be compliant. The end result is to
raise the cost of capital to countries with weak legal systems (on this point see
Kaufman and Wei [9] and Mui [12]).
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